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Abstract:  
   
Purpose: This study aims to establish the possibility of using weak signals during forensic 
auditing.  
Approach/Methodology/Design:  The insights in this paper have emerged iteratively through 
consideration of both theory and the empirical case based on public auditors' database 
analysis. Such an approach is consistent with an abductive approach. 
Findings:  A detailed analysis revealed that there is a need to use weak signals in forensic 
auditing practices. Besides, it was found that forensic auditing is not developed by supreme 
audit institutions, which are the most crucial auditor in the public sector. Such situation 
questions the effectiveness of these organisations in the fight against irregularities in the 
public sector. 
Practical Implications: The article brings several valuable information that can be the base 
material and reference to further research. It provides practical tips on how to plan and 
carry out forensic auditing using weak signals.  
Originality/Value: There are several studies on forensic auditing or weak signals; however, 
the research question – how to use weak signals during forensic auditing was without an 
answer. It is the first such research in the World. Besides, the article presents the original 
definition of forensic auditing. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Although forensic auditing is the subject of some research (Thornhill, 1995; 
Durtschi, 2003; Singleton and Singleton, 2010), there is a lack of sufficient studies 
on forensic auditing methods. Meanwhile, the scale of frauds, extortion and 
corruption is not decreasing globally. Developing countries with low wages are 
particularly at risk of crimes (Transparency International, 2019).  
 
The concept of forensic auditing has made a "career", particularly in developing 
countries, becoming a kind of buzz word in recent decades. It is an ambiguous and 
axiological term, as evidenced by different meanings of this concept adopted by 
scientists and practitioners (Thornhill, 1995; Durtschi, 2003; Grippo and Ibex, 2003; 
Squires, 2003; Amanatidou et al., 2005; Singleton et al., 2006; Gray and College, 
2008; Mohd and Mazni, 2008; Njanike et al., 2009; Kasum, 2009; Singleton and 
Singleton, 2010; Eiya and Otalor, 2013; Akenbor and Ironkwe, 2014). Interpretation 
discrepancies or defining forensic auditing as a set of description of its effects means 
that there is a need to define this type of audit. Therefore, there is a need to organise 
the conceptual apparatus and propose a universal definition of a forensic audit.  
 
Besides, a systematic review of the literature showed that there is a research gap in 
the field of using the concept of weak signals during forensic auditing. Considering 
the fundamental need for the development of forensic auditing concept on an 
international level, the author of this article would like to describe the weak signal's 
approach in forensic auditing. The research question is the following: Is it possible 
to use the weak signals approach in forensic auditing? The paper proceeds as 
follows. First, it reviews the previous research on forensic auditing and weak 
signals. After that, the audit method is discussed, followed by the results of the study 
and conclusion. 
 
2. Forensic Auditing  
 
Researchers do not question the need for forensic auditing in research and practice. 
It is also not surprising that there are many interpretations of what this type of audit 
is. Depending on the scientific discipline they represent, they define forensic 
auditing from an accounting or legal perspective. Akenbor and Ironkwe (2014) state 
that a forensic audit usually examines allegations and complaints about wrongdoing 
involving significant federal funds or assets. The audit procedures ensure that any 
evidence of wrongdoing may ultimately be presented in administrative, civil, or 
criminal proceedings. Grippo and Ibex (2003), underline that forensic audits are 
more intensive than regular audits and are usually conducted in a series of steps to 
determine if allegations can be substantiated. Thornhill (1995) states that forensic 
audits require a clear and detailed audit plan that is designed to obtain information 
on how, when, and where the wrongdoing occurred and who committed such 
wrongdoing. The above generalisations do not define the essence of forensic 




auditing and how such an audit differs from other types of audit, for example, 
performance auditing or financial auditing. 
 
The analysis of the literature (Cicchella, 2005; Crumbley, Heitger and Smith, 2007; 
Russell and Gordon, 2017) has shown that forensic audit is understood as the 
application of accounting methods to gathering evidence, usually to prosecute 
crimes such as embezzlement or fraud. This type of audit is also referred to as court 
accounting. It focuses on detecting irregularities in bookkeeping and preparing 
financial statements, as well as irregularities, e.g., related to bankruptcies of 
companies, detection of stock exchange fraud, tax fraud, money laundering, IT 
fraud.  
 
Other authors also focus their attention primarily on the effects of an investigative 
audit and thus distinguish it from other types of audit (Durtschi, 2003; Squires, 
2003; Amanatidou et al., 2005; Singleton et al., 2006; Gray and College, 2008; 
Mohd and Mazni, 2008; Njanike et al., 2009; Kasum, 2009; Singleton and 
Singleton, 2010; Eiya and Otalor, 2013). Therefore, there remains an unresolved 
problem of what an investigative audit is. In the light of the above characteristics of 
the forensic audit process, it is reasonable to generalise that such audit aims at 
assessing whether the activity of the audited organisation is correct from the 
perspective of the organisation's stakeholders. Forensic audit understood in this way 
serves to reduce the opportunism of the parties to the contract, which may contribute 
to the efficiency of management.  
 
The forensic audit is the type of audit with methods and techniques focused mainly 
on detecting irregularities (Dobrowolski and Kościelniak, 2018). The forensic audit 
is not intended to provide examples of best practice. Apart from the differences, 
there are also similarities of the forensic audit to other types of audit. The similarity 
to other types of audit stems from the forensic auditors' obligation to apply basic 
audit principles, such as objectivity, impartiality, due diligence, rules of writing, the 
presumption of innocence of the audited persons. All these rules are the same as the 
rules set out, among other things, in the international auditing standards 
(Dobrowolski and Kościelniak, 2018).  
 
A forensic audit is used to eliminate pathological phenomena, including fraud, 
corruption, mismanagement in the activities of an organisation, the occurrence of 
which hurts its image. Thus, it concerns de facto critical issues for the strategic goals 
of the organisation.  Early identification of threats allows for effective 
countermeasures. Therefore, one may generalise that forensic audit is similar to 
strategic control. The strategic control is understood as the process of change 
management by reacting to and influencing the factors determining the instability of 
the organisation (Lorange et al., 1986). One may generalise that forensic audit is the 
process which helps in risk management by identification and mitigation the factors 
increasing the instability of the organisation. 






3. Foresight and Weak Signals  
 
Foresight is broadly presented in the literature. Researchers have pointed out that 
foresight not only looks into the future but also includes utilising implementations 
for the present (Ansoff, 1982; Martin, 1995; Barker and Smith, 1995; Cuhls, 2003; 
Cuhls, 2008; Georghiou et al., 2008; Iden et al., 2017; Cuhls, 2019; Dobrowolski, 
2020). Foresight leads to the selection of one of the different future options and 
creation conclusion for the present, and decision for one of the options. Foresight is 
not planning. It can be seen as the bridge between past experiences, current and the 
future (Cuhls, 2003; Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2006; Georghiou et al., 2008; 
Dobrowolski, 2020). Therefore, one can generalise, that foresight is the overall 
process of creating an understanding of information generated by looking ahead 
(Dobrowolski, 2020).  
 
Foresight includes identification of weak signals, which are understood as early 
signs of upcoming events (Hiltunen, 2008; Saritas and Smith, 2011; Lambert and 
Sidhom, 2011). Weak signals are early warnings of something, which is coming 
(Mendonca et al., 2004; Smith and Dubois, 2010; Hauptman, Hoppe and Raban, 
2015). The pioneer of weak signal analysis development - Ansoff defined weak 
signals as warnings that are too incomplete to permit an accurate estimation of their 
impact and to determine a complete response (1982). These events, after the 
occurrence, affect individuals, groups and organisations and their environment in the 
very indefinite future (Botterhuis et al., 2010; Dobrowolski, 2020). Weak signals 
can use to identify and prevent some pathological phenomena (Brynielsson et al., 
2013) and can be perceived by the context of peripheral vision (Ilmola and Kuusi, 
2006). Weak signals can be compared to the concept of "red flags", which is used in 
the audit (Dobrowolski and Kościelniak, 2018). However, unlike red flags, which 
relies on an analysis of experience, weak signals can emerge for the first time in an 
organisation. 
 
There are several methods for identifying weak signals—first, scanning and 
monitoring. Next, almost every forensic audit, after establishing its scope and 
objectives, starts with scanning the external and internal environments for weak 
signals identification. Horizon scanning analyses potential challenges and likely 
future developments for a company or an area (Jackson, 2013). There are two types 
of horizon scanning: exploratory and issue-centred scanning. Exploratory scanning 
is focused on search by keywords, broad scanning. In the case of issue-centred 
scanning, the researcher should carry out the analysis of literature reviews, the 
analysis of additional sources related to the concrete issue (Amanatidou et al., 2012).  
 
There is also social scanning available. Pang (2010) underlines that such scanning 
consisting of aggregating and analysing publicly available content created by 
someone and shared on blogs and other social software platforms. 
 




Second, modelling, clustering, and interpretation. Researchers may use these 
methods for weak signals identification, assuming that there is a need to create the 
required model for analysis, and the forming and interpreting of groups of similar 
signals. The model includes three elements: object, a representant and interpretation 
and risk analysis. There are some software and tools for clustering data. It is worth 
noting that some authors (Thorleuchter and Van den Poel, 2012) propose the usage 
of semantic clustering approach to group documents with similar meaning for the 
further detection of weak signals. Third, expert's opinions obtained, among others, 
using heuristic methods can help identify weak signals.  
 
Fourth, the usage of software enables data analysis to identify weak signals. For 
example, Yoon (2012) has used web mining, comprising an intellectual analysis of 
web content. Rossel proposes to create a link between data analysis and developing 
strategies according to the results of data analysis (2011). Researchers may use 
deductive or inductive data analysis to identify weak signals (Cooper et al., 2011). 
 
4. The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions 
 
The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) is an 
autonomous, independent, and non-political organisation established as a permanent 
institution. It consists of SAIs from more than 180 countries. Its purpose is to set 
standards for public sector auditing (NTOSAI). INTOSAI, through its work, 
influences on other sectors. Public auditors in many countries have the power to 
assess the performance of private entities using public funds and implementing 
public contracts (Dobrowolski, 2017). 
 
5. Materials and Methods  
 
The research methodology is based on the literature study and audit standards and 
guidelines available on the INTOSAI webpage. Author of this article has assumed 
that INTOSAI collects all information about the activities of SAIs in the field of 
auditing. Thus, the author of this research used methods and techniques appropriate 
to the discipline of management science, taking into accounts the epistemological 
pluralism strategy. The insights in this paper have emerged iteratively through 
consideration of both theory and the empirical case. Such an approach is consistent 
with an abductive approach (Lukka, 2014; Lukka and Modell, 2010). 
 
6. Research Results and Discussion 
 
6.1 Forensic Auditing and INTOSAI  
 
Surprisingly INTOSAI, which is created by SAIs around the World, did not publish 
any guideline related to such type of audit (INTOSAI, 2020). Meanwhile, INTOSAI 
underlines in its strategic plan, that its mission is to "promote good governance by 






enabling SAIs to help their respective governments improve performance, enhance 
transparency, ensure accountability, maintain credibility, fight corruption, promote 
public trust, and foster the efficient and effective receipt and use of public resources 
for the benefit of their citizens". (INTOSAI, Strategic Plan 2017-2022).   
 
In support of the INTOSAI strategic goals, INTOSAI has identified five cross-
cutting priorities. It shows how INTOSAI will focus its work to achieve its goals in 
the coming years. INTOSAI points out Crosscutting Priority 4, stating the necessity 
of creating an agile INTOSAI that is alert to and capable of responding to emerging 
international opportunities and risks. By now, such declaration did not go into 
practice even by introducing the concept of forensic auditing. The global scale of 
corruption presented by Transparency International (2019) or money laundering 
threat presented by the Basel Institute on Governance (Basel AML Index) is 
enormous and should be well known by INTOSAI representatives. 
   
6.2 Forensic Auditing and Weak Signals  
 
Like any rational action, the forensic audit should also be an organised activity. The 
multiplicity of factors conducive to the occurrence of illegal phenomena in the 
company's operations, in particular corruption and fraud, requires high flexibility in 
the audit procedure. One should also remember about the selectivity of the audit. 
Such an approach assumes that it is not worth "wasting" human and material 
resources on auditing issues when the risk of irregularities consisting of violating 
specific standards will below. On the other hand, resources (usually limited) should 
be focused on analysing those areas of the company's operations that are of crucial 
importance to its operation, as well as the most vulnerable to irregularities 
(Dobrowolski, 2017; Dobrowolski and Kościelniak, 2018). Two groups can be 
distinguished in the portfolio of forensic audit initiatives. First, systematic forensic 
audit initiatives are resulting from the company's strategy or remedial programs. 
Such initiatives appear before phenomena indicating the possibility of irregularities 
in the company's operations. Secondly, forensic audit initiatives result from 
observation of the company's activities, suggestions, expectations, among 
stakeholders. Both types of initiatives are aimed at preventing the occurrence of 
irregularities in the company's operations.  
 
Among the methods and techniques for determining the scope of the subject and 
object of an audit at the planning stage, the following should be mentioned deferred 
valuation techniques, checklists, techniques for collecting and analysing expert 
opinions, surveys, interviews, text analysis, observations, morphological analysis of 
using the teratology method or Moles' discovery matrix. Yin and Dobrowolski aptly 
point out that the audit conclusion should not be developed only based on one 
particular audit method. Such an approach may be incorrect (Yin 1994; Dobrowolski 
2017; Dobrowolski and Kościelniak, 2018). Analysing documents one may use 




latent semantic indexing (LSI) for the identification of weak signals. This approach 
presents Thorleuchter and Van den Poe (2013). 
 
Weak signals can be identified during the analysis of the artefacts. Artefacts provide 
insight into the cultural features of the observed area, including forms of behaviour. 
Artefacts can express how goals are formulated and achieved by management and 
employees of the company (Yin, 1994). Observation of people and results of their 
activities allows to determine, among other customs, and is not only the basis for the 
analysis of documentation or interviews but can also supplement the methods 
mentioned above. The use of specific types of observation depends on the 
preferences of the forensic auditor and the stage of the audit. For example, in the 
initial stage of the audit, when learning about phenomena, non-participant 
observation is recommended, allowing for the analysis of phenomena from a 
"distance". Likewise, the choice of the type of interview depends on the stage of the 
audit. For example, a non-standardised, unstructured interview helps understand the 
behaviour of the management and employees of the audited company. Thus, it can 
be used in the initial stage of the audit (Dobrowolski and Kościelniak, 2018). The 
author of this article applied the observation of audited individuals' behaviour to the 
identification of weak signal of wrongdoings when analysing the company's 
operations. During the first meeting with the president of this company, he 
formulated sentences that were a weak signal of incorrectness. Further, an audit 
confirmed the validity of the adopted assumption. There were numerous 
irregularities in the company, and the president of the company was detained and 
arrested. 
 
Determining risk and materiality is essential in the process of any audit. A 
conclusion that the inherent risk should be determined based on the company's past 
performance cannot be entirely correct. There are several examples of collapses of 
companies listed on the stock exchange. Therefore, the legitimacy of a conclusion 
mentioned above raises justified doubts. A company without a history of 
malfunctioning may be infected with fraud or corruption. Therefore, in the case of a 
forensic audit, it is recommended to set the inherent risk as high when there are three 
risk categories low, medium, and high.  In particular, the following situation should 
support the increase in the inherent risk: frequent changes in the positions of chief 
financial officer. In this case, a weak signal may be the fact that the company's 
management searches for information on the Internet concerning the professional 
career of individual people. 
 
The examination of the proper functioning of the internal control serves to determine 
whether it ensures that there are no cases of misappropriation of funds, financial 
transactions are legal, in line with the assumptions, and booked following the 
applicable accounting procedures, which allows for the preparation of reliable 
financial statements and non-financial information. Establishing the effectiveness of 
internal control allows ones to limit the scope of auditing of operations and 






accounting balances. Auditors have to determine the risk of failure of internal 
control systems, which is divided into high, medium, or low.  Risk assessment is 
based on the experience of auditors, including the current functioning of the internal 
control system. Therefore, such an approach may generate secondary risk. The 
technique of risk estimation with the usage of "red flags" (symptoms of 
irregularities) may help determine the level of risk of failure of internal control 
systems and secondary risk assessment. Based on the author's observation, it can be 
concluded that a weak signal related to the improper functioning of the internal 
control system may be the formulation of opinions in conversations with internal 
auditors about scandals that occur around the world in private and public 
organisations. 
 
The auditor risk results from three reasons. First, from the use of inappropriate audit 
planning. Secondly, from incorrect substantive preparation of auditors who do not 
have the knowledge and skills necessary for the proper performance of the audit 
task. It also indirectly results from wrong audit planning. Thirdly, unfortunately, 
although such a situation should not take place, it cannot be ruled out that the proper 
performance of tasks may be hampered by a conflict of interest or a successful 
attempt to corrupt the auditor. In order to minimise such risk, forensic auditors 
should, before starting the audit, sign a declaration of no conflict of interest, as well 
as demonstrate that they have the required knowledge and skills to perform the task. 
The tool allowing to determine whether they meet the competence condition is the 
test which they should solve with a complimentary assessment. Their superiors 
determine the conditions for passing the test. An important issue is the written 
justification for the risk assessment and documenting it in the forensic audit working 
papers. A weak signal related to the auditor's incorrect work may be his or her 
browsing through offers for renting attractively located apartments during the 
holiday season or analysing of specific car brands. 
 
For forensic auditors, the materiality assumptions are slightly different than for other 
auditors. Namely, the subject of a forensic audit is not only financial statements but 
also other areas of activity of the audited organisations. The forensic audit report is 
submitted not only to the management of the audited entity. In the event of a 
justified suspicion that a crime has been committed, the forensic audit report 
together with the investigative audit files, will be material used by the relevant state 
authorities. Thus, the forensic auditor should consider the requirements of the future 
recipients of the forensic audit report when determining materiality. The forensic 
auditor should also assume that in the course of audit studies, acts may be revealed 
that infringe the welfare of the audited entity, including its image affecting public 
trust.   
 
The forensic auditor may use, among others scanning and monitoring methods for 
identifying weak signals. In a case of expert procedures, it is worth noting that 
expert interviews, workshops, and Delphi requires specific experts in the case of 




forensic auditing. It is not about the necessity to have specific knowledge and skills, 
but about the ability of participants to maintain professional secrecy and exclude 
conflict of interest. No doubt auditors may use brainstorming or other heuristic 
methods to identify weak signals collectively.   
 
Based on literature review and author's observation carried out in the year 1992-
2017 one may identify the following steps of weak signal analysis: 1) Determine 
goals and scope of forensic auditing; 2) Environmental scanning, which includes the 
creation of information and the analytical base, filtering and sorting information, the 
identification and clustering of weak signals, the clustering of documents and 
behaviours, identifying potential weak signal, the validation of weak signal and 
preparation of conclusions (Ponomareva and Sokolova, 2015).  
 
Auditors should identify keywords related to audit scope through manual browsing 
of webpages, using specialised software and taking into accounts experts' opinion. 
Auditors should match different data and sources of information. For example, 
during the review of procurement procedures, they should start browsing of 
webpages to find any data related to public officials engaged in public procurement, 
like their holidays. The public official who spends this holiday abroad could not 
participate in the procurement process at the same time. It is a signal that fraudulent 
practices could take place during procurement. 
 
During forensic auditing analysis of the company's stakeholders should take place, 
assuming that the management of the company's ventures is a product of the views, 
goals, and interests of various stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). The analysis allows for 
the determination of the actual balance of forces related to the implementation of 
specific projects by the company. Such an analysis may help identify weak signals 
related to the people who may exceed their powers or do not fulfil their obligations.  
 
Identification of stakeholders of projects implemented or planned for 
implementation by companies is necessary to draw up their characteristics, and 
therefore to establish contact details, describe their strengths and weaknesses, 
interests that accompany the company's operations, identify the impact of the 
company's projects on these interests, define the basis for and the actual ability of 
stakeholders to enforce their interests. Such analysis allows determining the 
stakeholders' strength of influence, i.e. their disposal of means allowing for forcing 
actions beneficial from their point of view. The strength of stakeholders' influence 
should be confronted with their involvement, i.e. the scope and intensity of activities 
undertaken by them in order to satisfy their interests. Such analysis allows 
determining the importance of stakeholders for the company. Knowledge of the 
above is essential for the investigative auditor forgetting to know the motives of 
specific entities performing tasks in the audited company. Besides, attention should 
be paid to possible discrepancies between the assumptions of the organisational 
structure and its actual functioning. These differences are most often caused by 






mistakes made in the process of formalisation of the structure, or most often as a 
result of changes in the environment. By comparing two structures (formal and 
existing), one can obtain information about respecting the formal organisational 
structure, real leadership, informal relationships, including the possible presence of 




Seemingly, the audit focuses on the past. The auditor examines mainly activities 
realised in the past. However, the audit serves the purpose of prevention and 
educating the representatives of organisations, not only the audited ones. Thus, audit 
activities influence the future tasks of various organisations. In this approach, the 
forensic audit is critical for proper risk management. 
 
A forensic audit, through its preventive measures, not only looks into the future but 
also includes utilising implementations for the present. One can generalise, that 
forensic audit like foresight can be perceived as the overall process of creating an 
understanding of information generated by looking ahead. Therefore, it should not 
be surprising that forensic audit may use not only risk identification methods but 
also early signs of upcoming events. The forensic auditors' knowledge of the 
methods and techniques of identifying warnings that are too incomplete to permit an 
accurate estimation of their multifaceted impact on organisation allows for the better 
accumulation of resources and a more precise organisational diagnosis. It is 
especially important when one realises that forensic audit concerns the identification 
of often criminal irregularities accompanied by collusion of silence.   
 
Based on the research, a radical conclusion can be drawn, that without the 
implementation of the assumptions of a forensic audit by SAIs, it is not easy to find 
a real possibility of successfully implementing the INTOSAI strategy. The poor 
global anti-corruption or anti-money laundering record reveals that existing SAIs' 
audit practices are not fully effective. From the SAIs perspective, the initiative 
should be taken to develop INTOSAI forensic audit standards and guidelines.  
 
While the research results concern SAIs, they may be useful to other practitioners. 
There is a need to protect the assets of each organisation against fraud and other 
irregularities. The research results, which are prolegomena, are also crucial for the 
development of management theory. They make it possible to determine the specific 
phenomena, to formulate generalisations relating to management functions and their 
mutual relations. The author sees the need to continue research on the use of weak 
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